Since the turn of the 21st
century, universities in English speaking countries have done very well out of
China’s continuing emergence as a major global economy.
The US, UK, Canada, Australia and New
Zealand have attracted Chinese students in their droves; students keen to
develop the skills necessary to compete in the global job market. In China, such is the extent of competition
in the job market that the minimum necessary requirement for a half-decent job
is a Masters degree.
The strategies employed by universities to
cash in on China’s seemingly unquenchable thirst for quality higher education
have been diverse. While almost all
universities recruit students directly, networks of agents are often used to
source Chinese students. In many cases,
these agents charge both the overseas university and the student for securing a
place. It is not unheard of, if the
student secures a scholarship, for the Chinese agent to demand a share of that
scholarship. Universities, depending on
the volume of students recruited, typically pay 10%-15% finders fee to the
agent from the first year’s tuition fees.
While such strategies are practically
universal, many universities have decided to adopt evermore complex recruitment
strategies. Pathways centres
partnerships have proved very successful in attracting international
students. Companies such as Kaplan, INTO
and Study Group have differing approaches to the establishment of Pathways
Centres at UK universities. However,
some view these “International Foundation Years” as a back door into quality HE
institutions, with entrance criteria significantly lower than that which is required
for direct entry to the university itself.
Nevertheless, the argument for pathways centres is that they help
educate the foundation level students to the required standards to undertake
full-time undergraduate study at leading universities. So successful are they at recruiting students
and channeling them to universities that many top UK universities have
established partnerships for Pathways Centres, including Liverpool, Sheffield,
Newcastle, Exeter, Glasgow, Nottingham Trent, Brighton, Bournemouth, Stirling,
Lancaster, Lincoln, Surrey, Sussex, Newport (Uni of Wales), Leicester, Keele,
Kingston, Heriot-Watt, East Anglia,
Manchester and Glasgow Caledonian. These
study centres, which are open only to international students – not UK students
- add a foundation year to a 3yr UK degree programme. Progression to the 3yr degree programme is
not guaranteed, but it does provide a way for students with insufficient
qualifications to gain access to UK HE, in many cases to leading universities.
Meanwhile joint-teaching programmes,
typically known as 2+2 programmes, at the UG level can be a good way for western universities to combat drop-out rates.
This is where a student enters a Chinese university for the first 2
years of their UG education, and then transfers for the final 2 years to an
overseas university. These types of
arrangements are widespread in China, but are viewed in a poor light by the
Ministry of Education (MoE), especially in instances where the sole focus is on
the export of Chinese students, rather than the development of robust teaching
and administrative procedures while the students are in the first 2 years of
the programme and studying with the Chinese partner. In 2007, the MoE issued a circular detailing
its lack of faith in such programmes and directly criticizing 2+2 programmes
where the foreign partner focused wholly on marketing and export of Chinese
students while neglecting teaching and administrative standards in the portion
of the degree programme delivered in China.
Neverthless, such programmes continue to be established in China, with
the MoE publishing a list of over 400 such approved Sino-Foreign joint
programmes in July 2010. More recently, Zhang Xiuqin of the MoE
announced a new crackdown on programmes with scathing remarks about “some
foreign educational institutes (which) take advantage of the programs in order
to make more money.” Mrs Zhang made the
comments while introducing a new MoE policy aimed at establishing tighter
quality control of joint-programmes, requiring Chinese and foreign universities
to go through a more rigorous approval process.
In addition to several documents (laws, regulations and circulars)
issued by the MoE since 2007, the message is clear: any foreign university
which does not provide clear benefits to Chinese higher education, or which
exports vast amounts of money in the form of transferred students’ tuition
fees, will come under close scrutiny.
A recent development is the establishment
of training colleges within leading Chinese universities which offer 1+3 and
2+2 programmes. These training colleges
have agreements with universities in the west to send students overseas after
completing a Foundation Year, or the first two years of a 4yr undergraduate
programme, usually comprised of a 1yr foundation with a focus on English for
Academic Purposes, and a 2nd year covering a common 1st
year of an undergraduate programme.
However, the implication is that such students are enrolled at the
Chinese university, when in fact they are not.
Mostly, they are students who have failed to score sufficiently in the
ultra-competitive Gaokao exam (University Entrance Exam) to secure a place at a
leading Chinese university, but who have sufficient wealth to pay higher
fees. The training college then enrolls
the student for 1 or 2 years, at fees 10 times higher than the standard Chinese
university fee, before sending them overseas for the remaining 2-3 years of the
degree programme. Such training centres
provide another “pathway” into HE at leading universities in the west, while
effectively circumventing entrance requirements. Students at these training centres pay much
higher fees than those enrolled at the Chinese university and are never
actually officially enrolled with the Chinese partner university (i.e. not
recognized by the MoE as undergraduate students) but with a wholly-owned
subsidiary training company owned by the university. Effectively, this allows for the complete
circumvention of entry standards and even IELTS or similar English language
requirements. It is unclear the extent
to which foreign (US, UK, Canadian etc) universities are complicit in this
process, or whether they genuinely believe they are getting Chinese students
from University X, rather than sub-standard students enrolled in a training
company owned by University X. To give
an example, there is one leading UK University which admits Chinese students
with scores of 450 out of 750 in the Gaokao.
Their Chinese partner would never accept a student with scores this low
into their own UG programmes, but they are happy to charge these students 9
times the standard Chinese university fee to be registered at their
“International College” where students are registered on 2+2 programme with the
world-class UK partner. Worse still, in
the event the student has a grade lower than 450, a qualifying interview can be
given to the student. This practice is
very widespread and becoming even more prevalent. To give an idea, whereas estalbished JV universities (see below) recruit exclusively Tier 1 Gaokao students from across China, setting entrance criteria as low as 450 (and in some cases lower) means students will be taken from Tier 3 and Tier 4, depending on which province they come from.
The boldest and most robust examples of
internationalization are to be found in the few Sino-Foreign Joint Venture
universities, notably Xi’an Jiaotong Liverpool University (XJTLU) and the
University of Nottingham Ningbo China (UNNC).
These universities recruit only through the Gaokao exam, and take only
those students with Tier 1 Gaokao scores.
Students at these two universities have the option of undertaking either
a 2+2 programme, or taking the whole of their 4yr degree in China. It is often thought that both XJTLU and UNNC
are “branch campuses” of the UK universities, but this is absolutely not the
case. Both are established under the
2003 Law and are legally independent and come under the direct jurisdiction of
the MoE. They are listed as official
universities in China and, as such, can recruit directly from the Gaokao in the
same manner that all other Chinese universities do. Having said that, the Gaokao recruitment
process is not an open market, with provinces having to negotiate with other
provinces for quotas. It is a process
which is characterized by strategic risk, where parents and students must
consider applications based not only on the scores they have achieved at
Gaokao, but also try to understand how other students will apply. For example, if a student from Shandong
Province has a Tier 1 Gaokao score, it may not be sufficient to enter their
chosen university. If that university
has only 100 places for Shandong students, they must take the first 100
students with scores in excess of the Tier 1 benchmark. So if 100 students with a score of 600+
apply, then the 101st student with 599 will be rejected, even if the
Tier 1 benchmark is set at 570.
Almost without exception, western
universities are looking to China to continue to provide a constant stream of
high-fee paying students. In my opinion,
the attitude of western universities, certainly those from Anglophone
countries, is, at times, indefensible.
It is highly questionable whether or not those universities developing a
presence in China want to contribute anything at all to the development of
Chinese higher education. All efforts
appear to be simply aimed at transferring large numbers of students back to the
UK, US or another country to help replenish the coffers. Allegedly collaborative HE programmes are
often characterized by arrogant western institutions trying to transplant their
home university’s bureaucratic systems into their Chinese partner institution,
showing scant regard for the cultural, social, legal and administrative
traditions of their Chinese partner and China. This is especially problematic when those
bureaucratic procedures and/or the quality standards of the programme are not
delivered to the required standards. Such
attitudes, whether parochial or ethnocentric, often leave the western side of
the “partnership” feeling isolated and at war with their Chinese partners. For those of us who’ve been in China a while,
it is a constant surprise to watch the sometimes adversarial approach of newcomers
and, especially, those ensconced back in Head Office. The simple fact is that the onus really is on
those working in China to adapt better to the distinctly different environment
and to respect China’s quite understandable wish that they deliver quality
education, rather than treat the country as a gravy train. Anyone with even the vaguest understanding of
modern China and its recent past will understand why this is the case. Unfortunately it appears many do not.
At the bottom end of the scale, poorly
conceived 2+2 programmes will continue to come under scrutiny from the MoE and
even provincial education bureaus.
However, those JV universities also need to protect themselves from
accusations that they are little more than large scale 2+2 programmes. There are constant rumours of more JV
universities being established, with Lancaster in talks with Guangdong
University of Foreign Studies (Guangwai); Duke University collaborating with
Wuhan University in the city of Kunshan, Jiangsu province , and New York
University establishing a JV campus in the Lujiazui Financial District of
Pudong, Shanghai with East China Normal University (ECNU) as its Chinese JV
partner. The latter two, Duke Kunshan
University and Shanghai New York University, launched with much fanfare last
year, yet both have recently announced they will open doors to students in
2013, rather than 2011 as first stated.
Both wanted to launch with Masters programmes, which, as anyone who
knows Chinese HE and specifically the establishment process for JV’s, must be
approved by the State Council (China’s cabinet). Thus far, neither have received approval from
the MoE to operate a JV campus, although both have buildings which have
received investment. With regards to Lancaster, no plans or proposals have yet emerged. They perhaps think
they can simply move their long-established 2+2 programme with Guangwai to a
new campus, but the establishment of a new JV is a far more complicated
prospect. Certainly, they will be forced
to raise their entry standards as a consequence of establishing a JV. In the event they are not establishing a JV, but rather a College of Guangwai, they will be forced to compete on the open market for students, accepting those students who have failed to score sufficiently in the Gaokao to secure a place at a Chinese university.
The period from 2000 to 2011 has all been
about recruitment of Chinese students to foreign universities, with knowledge
transfer also being a key factor in the MoE allowing the establishment of JV
universities. While it is beyond doubt
that Chinese students will continue to pursue overseas education, the policy of
the Chinese government and the MoE clearly oppose the continued treatment of
China as a cash cow. Indeed,
collaborative programmes which provide no benefit to the host (Chinese)
institution are unlikely to get off the ground.
For those familiar with Chinese legal documents, being very vague so as
to allow, not for interpretation in a variety of different ways, but for
enforcement by the authorities as they see fit, the 2006 amendment to the
Chinese 2003 Law on establishment of cooperative schools should be seen as a
watershed moment where Chinese HE moves to exert greater control of quality in cooperative education programmes. In addition the 2010-2020 Medium to Long-Term Education Plan explicitly states the importance of internationalization of Chinese universities, which is becoming manifest in Chinese HE discourse as a need to rebalance the high export of
students through fostering new strategies to import large numbers of foreign
students into China’s higher education system.
Next Week:
Part II:
The Changing Tide in the Internationalization of Chinese Higher
Education
MG
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